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Abstract
We discuss the idea that superpositions in quantum mechanics may involve contra-
dictions or contradictory properties. A state of superposition such as the one com-
prised in the famous Schrödinger’s cat, for instance, is sometimes said to attribute
contradictory properties to the cat: being dead and alive at the same time. If that were
the case, we would be facing a revolution in logic and science, since we would have
one of our greatest scientific achievements showing that real contradictions exist. We
analyze that claim by employing the traditional square of opposition.We suggest that
it is difficult to make sense of the idea of contradiction in the case of quantum super-
positions. From a metaphysical point of view the suggestion also faces obstacles, and
we present some of them.
Keywords: superposition; quantum mechanics; contradiction; paraconsistent logic;
square of opposition.
1 Introduction
The peculiar way superposition figures in quantum mechanics is sometimes said
to be “the” greatest feature of the theory. It brings such a level of novelty and
conceptual embarrassment that a proper understanding of this phenomenon is
still lacking, despite the efforts by many distinct interpretations advanced over
the years. Superposition is involved in most of the typical quantum enigmas such
as Schrödinger’s cat and the associated measurement problem; it is also central to
the Einstein-Bohr debate and to the problem of identical particles. Furthermore,
superposition is responsible for part of the great empirical applications and tech-
nological innovations based on the theory.
In a recent paper, da Costa and de Ronde [5] suggested that superpositions may
be better understood if a paraconsistent approach could be adopted: their claim
is that assuming that a superposition involves contradictions may be fruitful for
our understanding of superpositions and of quantum mechanics in general. Now,
while the idea that superpositions involve contradictions is a rather new one, this
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is not the first time in the history of quantum theory that a contradiction is said
be found in the core of the theory. Recall the early attempts at understanding the
atom with Bohr’s model, employing both classical mechanics and quantum prin-
ciples to describe the atom. Bohr’s model of the atom is generally claimed to be
inconsistent. Furthermore, the wave-particle duality and Bohr’s Complementarity
Principle are sometimes said to involve contradictions, or at least to generate para-
doxical situations. In a broadest context, contradictions are not rare in science; they
are said to appear in the early formulations of the infinitesimal calculus, in Frege’s
Grundgezetse and in Cantor’s naive set theory, among other contexts. So, the sug-
gestion that superpositions may involve contradictions is no singular situation in
the history of science.1
Roughly put, the idea that superposition is inconsistent is very simple: a state Ψ
in a superposition Ψ = αφ1 + βφ2 (with α
2 + β2 = 1) corresponds to a state simul-
taneously attributing contradictory properties to the system represented by this
state. Obviously, this idea may be understood as endorsing the system with ac-
tual contradictory properties or, alternatively, as attributing it only a contradictory
property in a “possible realm”. However the ontological status of contradictory
properties is interpreted, consider in particular a spin- 12 system in the sate | ↑z〉.
It is generally accepted without controversy that this system has spin up in the z
direction. But consider another direction, like x. In order to determine the proba-
bilities of obtaining the spin in x as up or down, we have to convert the state of
the system from | ↑z〉 to a superposition of | ↑x〉 and | ↓x〉. Now, it is the system in
such a superposition that is said to have contradictory properties, because the pro-
jectors | ↓x〉〈↓x | and | ↑x〉〈↑x |, representing the respective properties of having
spin down and spin up in the x direction, represent in fact contradictory properties.
So, quantum mechanics would be committed with contradictions somehow, and a
paraconsistent logic would be the most natural candidate for helping our under-
standing of such situations.
Here we shall examine precisely the suggestion that superpositions involve con-
tradictions. In particular, in section 2 we shall suggest — keeping with the case
of the 12 -spin system in the state | ↑z〉 and further examples — that properties
represented by projectors like | ↓x〉〈↓x | and | ↑x〉〈↑x | are perhaps not best un-
derstood as contradictory, so that if our suggestion is sound, superpositions of the
corresponding eigenstates would not really involve contradictions. In section 3 we
apply the square of opposition to this case and advance the thesis that such states
may represent rather contrary propositions. We suggest that it is possible to pro-
vide for an interpretation in order to extend plausibly the square to the hexagon
of opposition (for further information on the hexagon of opposition, see [3]). In
section 4 we shall investigate the suggestion at a metaphysical level. Our sugges-
tion is that even though a metaphysics of contradictory properties is not objection-
able in principle, some difficulties appear in connection with quantum mechanics.
We conclude with some remarks concerning the relation of logic and ontology in
quantum mechanics.
1. See da Costa and French [4] and Vickers [13] for further discussions on inconsistency in science.
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2 Contradictions in quantum mechanics
Now, let us take a closer look at the thesis that superpositions may involve contra-
dictions. As originally proposed by da Costa and de Ronde [5], the idea involves
two separated assumptions: first of all, for a 12 -spin system in the state | ↑z〉, prop-
erties represented by projectors | ↓x〉〈↓x | and | ↑x〉〈↑x | are contradictory. That is,
properties “to have spin up in the x direction” and “to have spin down in the x
direction” would be contradictory with one another. Secondly, the state of super-
position of the two states | ↑x〉 and | ↓x〉 would be a contradiction, it attributes
both (contradictory) properties to the system.
Obviously, the description of the previous paragraph takes into account only a par-
ticular system in a particular state, but the idea is that the thesis according to which
there may be contradictions in quantum mechanics can be generalized for any su-
perposition of states s1 and s2 that are classically incompatible (da Costa and de
Ronde also call them “classically inconsistent” —we shall investigate the meaning
of this statement later), so that a superposition of them provides for contradictory
attribution of properties. In particular, it seems that the famous double-slit experi-
ment also involves contradictions: the state Ψ = ψ1 +ψ2, with ψ1 meaning that the
particle went through the first slit, and ψ2 meaning that it went through the second
slit should also be seen as attributing it contradictory properties. Schrödinger’s cat,
in a state Φ = Cd + Ca, where Cd means that the cat is dead and Ca means that it
is alive is also supposed to be contradictory. We shall consider these cases in the
course of our exposition.
Our main interest in this section concerns the sense of “contradiction” that is at
stake here (we shall not provide an exhaustive analysis of this concept). We shall
suggest that even though it is tempting to see contradictions in superpositions, the
idea may be resisted, so that perhaps this is not a genuine case of inconsistency in
science.
As traditionally understood, a contradiction is a conjunction of a pair of propo-
sitions A and B such that one is the negation of the other, which are called con-
tradictories. Obviously, to state a contradiction one must employ a language with
negation, and natural language and many other artificial languages in logic and
mathematics satisfy this requirement (this is a syntactical requirement). A second
important feature of a contradiction is encapsulated by the square of opposition
(see [3]), and concern the semantics of a contradiction: in supposing classical logic,
when A and B are contradictory, one of them is true and the other false, we cannot
have both true or both false (this is the semantic requirement). Let us encapsulate
those requirements on a language £ as follows:
1. The language £must have a negation sign;
2. Contradictory statements of £must always have opposite truth values.
Given those features of a contradiction, are we able to investigate whether a su-
perposition like α| ↑x〉+ β| ↓x〉 represents a contradiction in the traditional sense.
In order for that to happen, at least the following two conditions must be assured,
for our previous requirements for a contradiction to obtain:
1. | ↑x〉 and | ↓x〉 must both obtain and also assumed to be the negation of one
another.
2. The statements corresponding to properties represented by | ↓x〉〈↓x | and
| ↑x〉〈↑x | must have opposite truth values.
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Consider now the first case. To begin with, by accepting for the sake of argument
that the states | ↑x〉 and | ↓x〉 could somehow be taken as one being the negation
of the other (so that the syntactical requirement could be satisfied), we should also
accept that the plus sign + in Hilbert spaces (where we express a superposition as
a sum of vectors) represents some form of conjunction, of “obtaining together”. In
the case of the double slit, we would have that the system Ψ = ψ1 + ψ2 would be
describing a situation in which a particle goes by both slits. For the Schrödinger
cat, the state Φ = Cd + Ca describes a situation in which the cat is both dead and
alive. Now, the problem is that hardly anyone would allow that the sum could be
read as conjunction, since their meanings are very different. If the distinction is not
immediate, one can check this from the very fact that they are different operations,
there are some properties distinguishing them: conjunction is idempotent, while
sum of vectors in a Hilbert space is not. So, there is a first difficulty in passing from
superposition to contradiction, as usually understood, for a vector sum does not
immediately amounts to simultaneous reality (whatever this means).
Now, besides that point concerning the differences between vectors sums and con-
junctions, let us examine the idea that | ↑x〉 and | ↓x〉 are states to which contra-
dictory properties are attributed. In order for that to happen, we would have to
allow that some feature of Hilbert space representation, in this case, orthogonal-
ization, represents negation, and second, that their semantic features fit the role of
contradictory statements as mentioned above. For ease of reading, let us call ux
the proposition that the system has spin up in the x direction; dx is the proposition
that the system has spin down in the x direction. Then, according to the suggestion
above, ux and dx are contradictory. Let us investigate this proposal.
If it is indeed true that ux and dx are contradictory, then both cannot be true and
both cannot be false at once. Let us see whether this is the case in quantum me-
chanics. To begin with, let us state a minimal condition for property attribution,
one which will also make room for modal interpretations and the paraconsistent
one we are examining here, and which shall guide part of our investigations (for
this minimal condition, see also Muller and Saunders [11, p.513]):
The minimal property attribution condition: If a system is in an eigenstate of an
operator with eigenvalue v, then the system has the qualitative property cor-
responding to such value of the observable.
Notice that this is weaker than the usual eigenvalue-eigenvector link, stating only
a conditional. The interpretation we are examining here proposes to complement
the minimal condition by describing how a system bears properties when not in
an eigenstate:
Paraconsistent property attribution: When in a superposition, the system does
have the properties related to the vectors forming the superposition, and
they are contradictory.
Let us check how those two principles attribute properties to quantum systems
and whether there are reasons to suppose that ux and dx are contradictory (recall
the semantic condition that must be fulfilled). First of all, when the system has
spin up in the x direction, i.e., when the statement ux is true, then by the above
minimal condition, the probability of having spin up is 1 and the probability of
having spin down in the x direction is 0, so that it is false that the system has spin
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down in the x direction, i.e, dx is false. The same holds when dx is true: we have
that ux is false. So, when the conditions for application of the minimal principle are
met, both states have opposite truth values. But the job is still not done: we must
still grant that one of those propositions must always be the case (being so that
the other one will be false), as the semantic requirement for a contradiction seems
to demand. In the case of spin for 12 -systems, this corresponds to the requirement
that for any given spatial direction, one (and only one) of the two options “up”
or “down” will always have to be the case. However, as we shall suggest, there
are difficulties in satisfying this requirement along accepting the paraconsistent
property attribution.
First of all, it seems that the semantic requirement that one of the two terms in a
superposition must always be the case (so that we can have a contradiction) is in
fact in conflict with the paraconsistent property attribution principle. For the latter
principle to apply, in the case of a superposition, both “up” and “down” would
have to be the case simultaneously. Recall what happens in the case of the two slit or
Schrödinger’s cat: according to this proposal, the particle must go by both slits, the
cat must be dead and alive. So, there cannot be alternate truth values in this case,
for both must be simply true. So, there is a conflict of the paraconsistent property
attribution principle with the very requirement that the vectors in a superposi-
tion stand for contradictory properties, at least according to the usual semantic
requirements related to contradictions, as it appears in the traditional analysis of
this concept.2 It seems that one cannot have both the claim that ux and dx are con-
tradictory and the claim that a superposition involves contradictions, as supplied
by the paraconsistent property attribution principle. As it stands, it seems, these
demands are incompatible.
In the second place, there seem to be problemswith both (incompatible) conditions
even when taken on their own. To begin with, it is not always plausible to suppose
that for any property, a quantum systemmust be so that it has the qualitative prop-
erty corresponding to one of the associated eigenvalues, while the other ones do
not obtain. That is, the semantic requirement for a contradiction, when applied to
statements such as dx and ux supposed contradictories, seems to be in conflict with
most interpretations of quantum mechanics and even with some of its limitative
theorems. As is well-known, by results such as the Kochen-Specker theorem, one
cannot attribute truth values ‘truth’ and ‘false’ to every proposition corresponding
to property attribution to a system, so that it is not always the case that for any
property whatever, a system either has it or does not have it. Given that quantum
mechanics is a probabilistic theory and that one cannot attribute only 0s and 1s as
probability for the possible outcomes of measurements, some properties are not
allowed to have such a comfortable feature of being instantiated or not instanti-
ated. Furthermore, this requirement seems to lead to problems in the results in the
case of some experiments. For instance, consider the two slit experiment. If it is
indeed the case that the statements “the particle went through slit 1” and “the par-
ticle went through slit 2” are contradictory and have always opposite truth values,
then the expected result of a two slit experiment would never be the interference
pattern typical of the experiment, but rather the pattern obtained when the slits
are opened one at a time alternatively.
2. We do not think that traditional definitions are untouchable and sacred, but if a proposal is sup-
posed to violate traditional standards, then it is those traditional standards that must be taken for
granted and shown to be violated.
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Furthermore, the paraconsistent property attribution principle also seems to gen-
erate problems of its own (we shall discuss this point again in section 4). It is not
clear that, as in the case of a two slit experiment, the attribution of both proper-
ties to the system will generate the interference patterns. Rather, it seems more
plausible to suppose that superposition is a phenomenon not reducible to prop-
erty attribution, even if it is a paraconsistent one. Furthermore, the paradox of the
cat that is dead or alive does not get closer to being understood when we suppose
that it has both properties. So, once again, attributing both properties to the sys-
tem does not seem to generate a better understanding of the phenomenon. Finally,
this kind of move makes it even more difficult to understand how a typical mea-
surement of a system in superposition yields always determinate results, but not
contradictory results: one must be able to explain how a property possessed by the
system disappears, while the other one remains.
So, as we shall suggest in the next section, states in superposition do not seem to
involve contradictions. Perhaps the fact that there is not a straightforward way to
read a contradiction from a superposition can be also seen from the formal analysis
employed in da Costa and de Ronde [5, p.855], where a paraconsistent set theory
ZF1 is employed. Considering a system S which is in a superposition of states s1
and s2, the authors introduce a predicate symbol K(S, s1) to represent the predi-
cate that “S has the superposition predicate associated with s1”. The same reading
holds with obvious adaptation for K(S, s2) and for ¬K(S, s1) and ¬K(S, s2). To ac-
count for a contradiction, a Postulate of Contradiction is introduced: when S is in a
superposition of s1 and s2, we have
K(S, s1) ∧ ¬K(S, s1) ∧ K(S, s2) ∧ ¬K(S, s2).
“This means that superposition implies contradiction” [5, p.855].
Notice that in this postulate the contradiction does not come from the fact that two
states s1 and s2 form the superposition or are related somehow, but rather from the
assumption that in a superposition the conjunction K(S, s1) ∧ ¬K(S, s1) is present
(aswell as K(S, s2)∧¬K(S, s2)). That is, the contradiction comes not from a relation
between s1 and s2, but from a relation of s1 with its negation (which obviously is a
contradiction in the language; the same holds for the case of s2). Now, that seems
to change the locus of the contradiction; it is placed no longer in the statement that
properties represented by projectors like | ↓x〉〈↓x | and | ↑x〉〈↑x | are contradictory
and it seems hard to say that under this particular analysis s1 and s2 (or, for our
previous example, ux and dx) are contradictory. The introduction of a negation sign
to allow for a contradiction is a symptom of that change of focus. It seems now that
in a superposition s1 is contradictory with its own negation, and the same holds
for s2.
However, that move seems to be unmotivated. Everything that a superposition
puts in a system, in terms of the vectors that are part of the superposition, this
reading also takes off from the superposition, so that in the end we have no in-
formation at all. In the case of the two slit experiment, the system Ψ = ψ1 + ψ2 is
indeed stating, according to this reading, that the systemwent through the first slit,
it did not went through the first slit, it went through the second slit, and went not
through the second slit. It seems that the contradiction cancels the informational
charge of a superposition.
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Also, concerning the role of the negation in the above formal analysis, some is-
sues arise. It seems that there are two options concerning the role of the negation
sign here: either ¬K(S, s1) is equivalent to K(S, s2) or it is not. In the second case,
then, as we mentioned previously, the contradiction comes from postulation of
both K(S, s1) and ¬K(S, s1), not from any peculiar relation between s1 and s2 in
superposition. In this case, the claim is at odds with the suggestion that the vectors
forming a superposition are contradictory among themselves. On the other hand,
if there is an equivalence, then it should be a theorem or another axiom of the para-
consistent theory ZF1 that K(S, s1) ↔ ¬K(S, s2) and also K(S, s2) ↔ ¬K(S, s1). Our
suggestion is that such equivalence would become problematic for systems whose
basis can be composed by more than two vectors. Consider now a simple system
in superposition of three orthogonal states a, b and c, and for simplicity, let pa, pb
and pc represent the propositions “the system is in a”, “the system is in b” and
“the system is in c”, respectively. Now, since each proposition is equivalent to the
negation of the others, we have i) pa ↔ ¬pb, ii) pc ↔ ¬pa and iii) pc ↔ ¬pb. By a
chain of equivalences, from iii) and ii) we have pc ↔ ¬pa, and from this result and
i) we have pa ↔ ¬pa. Of course, that may be fine for when we use a paraconsistent
logic, but seems to be the a strange analysis when a system is indeed in the state
pa: that would imply that it is also not in such a state. So, once again, this does not
seem to be the correct analysis of the contradiction, and the contradiction does not
result from a relation from the states in superposition, but rather is introduced by
the Postulate of Contradiction.
3 The square of opposition
Given that “contradiction” is not really mandatory on us in cases of superposi-
tions, are there any alternatives for us to understand logically the relation of states
in superposition? Even more generally, how are we to understand the relation be-
tween quantum observables such as | ↓x〉〈↓x | and | ↑x〉〈↑x |? We suggest that the
square of opposition may be used to throw some light on this issue (see also [2],
[3]). Let us present the details of our analysis.
Recall that the square was introduced in medieval times to represent the logical
relationships between the four categorical propositions in Aristotelian logic and to
capture some imediate inferences holding among them. The four propositions are
A: “All S are P”, E: “No S is P”, I: “Some S are P”, andO: “Some S are not P. Their
relations of opposition are summarized as follows:
1. A and E are contrary.
2. A andO as well as E and I are contradictory.
3. I andO are subcontrary.
4. I is subaltern of A, andO is subaltern of E.
Having said that, we shall not use categorical propositions, but rather the propo-
sitions ux and dx presented before as our case study, and enlarge the idea of the
square to cope with these “propositions” as well. That is, we shall investigate their
logical relations according to the frame of the square of opposition. To begin with,
we suggest that ux and dx are better thought as contraries rather than as contra-
dictories: contraries are propositions that cannot both be true, but that can both be
false. Indeed, if it is true that dx, then obviously it is false that ux, and if it is true
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that ux, then it is false that dx. So, in our opinion quantummechanics is not contra-
dictory after all when a superposition is written. Then, at the place of the square
of opposition where one usually finds propositions A and E we have ux and dx,
bearing the same logical relation.
An immediate problem appears now: given that ux and dx are contraries and not
contradictories, what could be the contradictory of ux? And what would be the
contradictory of dx? For that question to be answered, obviously, we would have to
introduce a negation sign. For that purpose, we introduce the negation of a quan-
tum proposition, allowing that the contradictory of ux would be ¬ux, the proposi-
tion expressing that “the system does not have spin up in the x direction”. Then,
it is clear that besides ux and dx being contrary, ux and ¬ux are contradictory, as
well as dx and ¬dx. This gives us what traditionally is pictured as the relation that
A bears with O and that E bears with I, respectively.
Notice that from a quantummechanical point of view the negation sign introduced
here presents no problem. It is true in the theory that a system either has a given
property (have spin up in the x direction, for instance) or does not have it. The
real novelty comes from the distinct ways a system may fail to have a property: by
being in a superposition, by not being in the required eigenstate because its state
is an eigenstate of an observable that does not commute with the observable being
measured, and perhaps even more.
The definition above of contradictory quantum sentences also gives us immedi-
ately that ¬dx is subaltern to ux , and ¬ux is subaltern to dx. Obviously, if the sys-
tem has spin up in x, then it does not have spin down in x, and correspondingly,
if the system has spin down in x, then, it is not up in x. So subalterns are also
granted by our schema. Following the traditional notation, this accounts for the
relation between A and I on the one hand, and between E and O on the other.
The only thing left to complete the square is a proper relation of subcontrariety.
According to our definition, ¬ux and ¬dx would be the candidates to be subcon-
traries of one another. Do they satisfy the requirement, namely, can they be both
true, but not both false? First, they can both be true: a system may neither have
spin up nor down in a given direction, being it enough that it is in a superposition
of up and down in that direction. Can both be false? Not really, because that would
give us that the system is up and down in the same direction, which is impossible.
This accounts for the traditional relation between I andO.
To accomplish an even better relation with the situation in quantum mechanics,
however, we still can complete the square to obtain an hexagon. As usually un-
derstood (again, see [3]), the hexagon complements the the traditional square by
adjoining a top element, understood as totality, the disjunction from A and E, and
a bottom element, the conjunction of I and O. Let us see that they make complete
sense in our schema for the quantum case.
For the case of the top, we must have one of both dx and ux, making their disjunc-
tion. This is nice to represent a situation where there is only epistemic ignorance
as to the state of the system. That is, we don’t know whether the system is up
or down, but it is surely in one of those states, and a measurement of the respec-
tive observable allow us to determine which is the case. One of them will be the
outcome of a possible measurement. Don’t confuse it with superposition. For the
bottom case, when we have both ¬dx and ¬ux, it can be used to represent a typ-
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ical situation of a system in a state in a superposition: before the measurement, it
is neither up nor down. This is precisely the opposite of what is proposed by the
paraconsistent property attribution principle, but it seems to respect the intuition
that quantum superpositions are phenomena not reducible to classical phenom-
ena, in particular, not to classical predication. We shall present more difficulties for
the paraconsistent approach in the next section, and we hope they also motivate
our reading of superposition.
4 Contradictory metaphysics and quantum mechanics
Now, we change focus and concentrate on the idea that a superposition may be ac-
cepted as incorporating contradictory properties just like systems in an eigenstate
do have properties. Even if the candidate property represented by the superposi-
tion is assumed to exist only at a possible or potential level, we suggest that some
difficulties appear.
The very idea that somemathematical piece employed to develop an empirical the-
ory may furnish us information about unobservable reality requires some care and
philosophical reflection. The greatest difficulty for the scientifically minded meta-
physician consists in furnishing the means for a “reading off” of ontology from
science (see Arenhart and Krause [1] for a related discussion). What can come in,
andwhat can be left out? Different strategiesmay provide for different results, and,
as we know, science does not wear its metaphysics on its sleeves. The first worry
may be making the metaphysical piece compatible with the evidence furnished by
the theory.
The strategy adopted by da Costa and de Ronde [5]may be called top-down: we in-
vestigate higher science and, by judging from the features of the objects described
by the theory, we look for the appropriate logic to endow it with just those fea-
tures. In this case (quantum mechanics), there is the theory, apparently attributing
contradictory properties to entities, so that a logic that does cope with such feature
of objects is called forth.3 Now, even though we believe that this is the in great
measure the right methodology to pursue metaphysics within scientific theories,
there are some further methodological principles that also play an important role
in these kind of investigation, principles that seem to lessen the preferability of the
paraconsistent approach over alternatives.
To begin with, let us focus on the paraconsistent property attribution principle.
According to that principle, recall, the properties corresponding to the vectors in a
superposition are all attributable to the system, they are all real. The first problem
with this rendering of properties (whether they are taken to be actual or just poten-
tial) is that such a superabundance of properties may not be justified: as Maudlin
[10] has recalled (although in a different context), not every bit of a mathematical
formulation of a theory needs to be reified. Some of the parts of the theory are
just that: mathematics required to make things work, others may correspond to
3. A similar approach is used in the case of the problem of identity and individuality of particles in
quantummechanics: according to some views, identity and individuality are lost for quantum particles.
Non-reflexive logics are logics developed to reflect that fact (see French and Krause [8]), and are strong
enough to accommodate the development of a non-reflexive version of quantummechanics, that is, the
theory is built again with the respective metaphysical principles already embedded in the underlying
logic (see [7]).
9
genuine features of reality. The greatest difficulty is to distinguish them, but we
should not assume that every bit of it corresponds to an entity in reality. So, on the
absence of any justified reason to assume superpositions as a further entity on the
realms of properties for quantum systems, we may keep them as not representing
actual properties (even if merely possible or potential ones).
That is, when one takes into account other virtues of a metaphysical theory, such
as economy and simplicity, the paraconsistent approach seems to inflate too much
the population of our world. In the presence of more economical candidates doing
the same job and absence of other grounds on which to choose the competing pro-
posals, themore economical approaches take advantage. Furthermore, considering
economy and the existence of theories not postulating contradictions in quantum
mechanics, it seems reasonable to employ Priest’s razor — the principle according
to which one should not assume contradictions beyond necessity (see Priest [12])
— and stick with the consistent approaches. Once again, a useful methodologi-
cal principle seems to deem the interpretation of superposition as contradiction as
unnecessary.
The paraconsistent approach could take advantage over its competitors, even in
the face of its disadvantage in order to accommodate such theoretical virtues, if it
could endow quantum mechanics with a better understanding of quantum phe-
nomena, or even if it could add some explanatory power to the theory. In the face
of some such kind of gain, we could allow for some ontological extravagances: in
most cases explanatory power rules over matters of economy. However, it does
not seem that the approach is indeed going to achieve some such result. As we
mentioned before, attributing contradictory properties to a quantum system seems
to simply eliminate the superposition as a source of information. Nothing is said
about the system, because everything said is also denied.
Besides that lack of additional explanatory power or enlightenment on the theory,
there are some additional difficulties here. There is a complete lack of symmetry
with the standard case of property attribution in quantummechanics. As it is usu-
ally understood, by adopting the minimal property attribution principle, it is not
contentious that when a system is in one eigenstate of an observable, then we may
reasonably infer that the system has the property represented by the associated ob-
servable, so that the probability of obtaining the eigenvalue associated is 1. In the
case of superpositions, if they represented properties of their own, there is a com-
plete disanalogywith that situation: probabilities play a different role, a system has
a contradictory property attributed by a superposition irrespective of probability
attribution and the role of probabilities in determining measurement outcomes. In
a superposition, according to the proposal we are analyzing, probabilities play no
role, the system simply has a given contradictory property by the simple fact of
being in a (certain) superposition.
For another disanalogy with the usual case, one does not expect to observe a sys-
tem in such a contradictory state: every measurement gives us a system in particu-
lar state, never in a superposition. If that is a property in the same foot as any other,
why can’t we measure it? Obviously, this does not mean that we put measurement
as a sign of the real, but when doubt strikes, it may be a good advice not to assume
too much on the unobservable side. As we have observed before, a new problem
is created by this interpretation, because besides explaining what is it that makes
a measurement give a specific result when the system measured is in a superposi-
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tion (a problem usually addressed by the collapse postulate, which seems to be out
of fashion now), one must also explain why and how the contradictory properties
that do not get actualized vanish. That is, besides explaining how one particular
property gets actual, one must explain how the properties possed by the system
that did not get actual vanish.
Furthermore, even if states like 1√
2
(| ↑x〉+ | ↓x〉)may provide for an example of a
candidate of a contradictory property, because the system seems to have both spin
up and down in a given direction, there are some doubts when the distribution of
probabilities is different, in cases such as 2√
7
| ↑x〉+
√
3
7 | ↓x〉. What are we to think
about that? Perhaps there is still a contradiction, but it is a little more inclined to
| ↓x〉 than to | ↑x〉? That is, it is difficult to see how a contradiction arises in such
cases. Or should we just ignore the probabilities and take the states composing the
superposition as somehow opposed to form a contradiction anyway? That would
put metaphysics way too much ahead of science, by leaving the role of probabili-
ties unexplained in quantum mechanics in order to allow a metaphysical view of
properties in.
5 Final remarks
To finish these remarks on the paraconsistent approach to superposition, wewould
like to emphasize that this core quantum concept (superposition, and in particular,
entanglement), still seems to lack an adequate logical foundation. As Paul Dirac
has said ([6, p.12]), it cannot be understood by means of classical concepts, and we
guess that we need even another kind of logic to deal with it (we have proposed a
particular kind of modal logic for that; see Krause, Arenhart and Merlussi [9]), but
it seems to us that this logic is not a paraconsistent one. The idea that superposition
may be understood in terms of contradiction and paraconsistent logic still requires
some elaboration in order to overcomes some of the doubts the proposal naturally
raises.
That is, even though we are sympathetic to the use of alternative logics to deal
with ontological problems in science and with the foundations of science itself, it
seems that a paraconsistent approach to quantum mechanics is still facing many
difficulties; more articulation is still required in order for the approach to work.
In the face of the compatibility of distinct metaphysical packages with quantum
mechanics, some of them more economic than the paraconsistent one, one should
develop and further clarify the paraconsistent view in order to be able to clearly
present its advantages over the alternatives. As usual, attributions of contradiction
to some physical theory does face the problem ofmaking the contradiction explicit,
and we hope that our analysis with the square of oppositions hasmade it clear that
in some cases quantum propositions are indeed in some kind of opposition, but the
opposition is contrariety, not contradiction proper.
Also, we do not believe that the approach to quantum propositions by the square
as suggested above is easily generalizable to quantum propositions of any sort. In
particular, for observables with continuous spectra it seems that it is not possible
to deal with quantum propositions taking just two at each time and studying their
11
relations as to what kind of opposition obtains. If this is really the case, then, ob-
viously, it is still in complete agreement with our claim throughout the paper that
superposition is a completely sui generis phenomenon.
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